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Abstract. The community deception problem is about how to hide a
target community C from community detection algorithms. The need
for deception emerges whenever a group of entities (e.g., activists, po-
lice enforcements) want to cooperate while concealing their existence as
a community. In this paper we introduce and formalize the community
deception problem. To solve this problem, we describe algorithms that
carefully rewire the connections of C′s members. We experimentally show
how several existing community detection algorithms can be deceived,
and quantify the level of deception by introducing a deception score.
We believe that our study is intriguing since, while showing how decep-
tion can be realized it raises awareness for the design of novel detection
algorithms robust to deception techniques.
1 Introduction
Many aspects of everyday life involve networks; social networks, biological net-
works, and the World Wide Web are just a few examples. The study of networks
touches many disciplines ranging from physics to computer and social science.
One important task in network analysis is the identification of communities, that
is, regions (subsets of vertices) of a network that help to gain insights about its
structure [10]. Detecting communities is useful for several purposes such as iden-
tifying topics in information networks [21], criminal organization from mobile
networks [8], friendship in social networks [26] or motifs in biological networks [9].
While community detection is a well-understood and studied problem, little
has been done in terms of community deception. Solving the community de-
ception problem amounts at devising techniques to conceal the existence of a
target community from community detection algorithms. Studying community
deception is intriguing from two different perspectives. On one hand, deception
techniques can be useful for activists in despotic regimes to hide themselves (as
a group) from software like the Laplace’s Demon, a protest monitoring system
developed by a pro-Kremlin group [7]; or, police enforcements to avoid to be
tracked as done by Ukrainian bloggers that tracked Russian soldiers on social
media [24]. On the other hand, the study of deception techniques raises awareness
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for design of novel community detection algorithms robust to community decep-
tion techniques as deception could also be used for malicious purposes. When
embarking on the study of community deception we identified some research
challenges, among which: (i) how to practically realize community deception?
(ii) how to devise computationally feasible algorithms? (iii) how to assess the
degree of deception of a target community C? We show how to tackle challenge (i)
by rewiring in a principled way the connections of C′s members. As for challenge
(ii) we present two greedy algorithms; the first based on modularity and the
second one based on a novel measure of community safeness. To tackle challenge
(iii) we introduce a deception measure that computed before and after applying
community deception algorithms allows to measure their success.
Related Work. Community detection algorithms strive to maximize cluster qual-
ity measures such as modularity [2,16], adopt probabilistic approaches based,
for instance, on random walks [26,22] or use network attributes [26]. Yet other
approaches study the problem of finding a community given a set of vertices [1].
Fortunato [10] provides a comprehensive study on this topic while other studies
focus on the evaluation of community detection algorithms (e.g., [15,25]).
In this paper we take a different direction and tackle the problem of designing
algorithms to deceive community detection algorithms. Our goal is to to hide a
community from being discovered by community detection algorithms. We are
not aware of any previous work on this topic. Note that community deception
differs from community preservation. This latter problem is usually tackled via
techniques such as k-anonymity, k-degree anonymity [4] or k-isomorphism [5] and
is focused on the assessment of how well the anonymization preserves commu-
nities from the original network [4]. In contrast, tackling community deception
does not require anonymization as the goal is to hide a community while keeping
its identity (i.e., the identity of its members) untouched.
Contributions and Outline. We make the following main contributions:
• introducing and formalizing the community deception problem, which, to
the best of our knowledge, has no been studied before;
• presenting two algorithms for community deception, one based on modularity
and the other based on a novel measure of community safeness;
• showing how our algorithms are able to deceive several existing community
detection algorithms on real and synthetic networks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
problem and provides an example. Section 3 presents our first algorithm for
community deception based on modularity. In Section 4 we introduce our sec-
ond algorithm based on community safeness. The experimental evaluation is
discussed in Section 5. We conclude and sketch future work in Section 6.
2 Problem Statement and Running Example
A network G = (V,E) is an undirected graph that includes a set of n:=|V |
vertices and m:=|E| edges. We denote by deg(v)=|N(v)| the degree of v,
where N(v) is the set of neighbors of v. The set of communities is denoted
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by C={C1, C2, ...Ck} and Ci ∈ C denotes the i-th community. E(Ci) denotes
the set of edges that are incident to some nodes in Ci. We distinguish between
intra-community edges of the form (u, v) : u, v ∈ Ci and inter-community edges
of the form (u, v):u ∈ Ci, v ∈ Cj . The degree of a community is denoted by:
deg(Ci)=
∑
v∈Ci deg(v). E
+ (resp., E−) denotes a set of edge additions (resp.,
deletions) on G. We denote by C ⊆ V the community, not necessarily part of C,
that we want to hide from community detection algorithms.
Problem 1 (Community Deception) Let G = (V,E) be a network and AD
a community detection algorithm. Given a community C ⊆ V , and a deception
function φAD (G,G
′), find a network G′ = (V,E′) with E′ = (E∪E+)\E− such
that:
argmax
G′
{φAD (G,G′)} (1)
where E+⊆{(u, v) : u∈C ∨ v∈C, (u, v)/∈E} and E−⊆{(u, v) : u∈C ∨ v∈C, (u, v)∈E}
}
The function φAD mimics the process of deceiving a community detection
algorithm AD so that C /∈ C. Solving the community deception problem amounts
at designing algorithms capable to find an updated network G′ = (V,E′) so that
φ(G,G′) is maximized. An optimal algorithm for this problem is computationally
hard as it requires an exhaustive exploration of all possible combinations of
(subsets of) edge updates (i.e., E+ and E−). As we will describe shortly, we
resort to greedy algorithms that find the local optimum at each evaluation step.
Moreover, to measure the level of deception of C we introduce the H score,
which encompasses different kinds of information such as reachability between
C′s members and their spreading in C = {C1, C2, ...Ck}. This score (see Defi-
nition 13), computed before (HG(C,AD)) and after (H
G′(C,AD)) the usage of
a community deception algorithm, allows to quantify its performance – we will
write HG
′
when C and AD are clear from the context. The worst case (i.e., H=0)
occurs when C belongs to the output of AD (C ∈ C). If C /∈ C then C′s members
can be spread inside C in many ways, thus leading to many H values. The best
H (i.e., H∼1) is obtained when C′s members are reachable from one another
and spread in different (large) communities.
Running Example. Consider the Zachary’s Karate Club network [27] and the
partition in communities C = {C1, C2, C3,C} shown in Fig. 1 (a) obtained by the
Louvain community detection algorithm (AD=louv) [2]. To model the worst-case
scenario from the deception point of view, we assume C={24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 32},
that is, C ∈ C and thenHG(C,AD)=0. We now outline our deception algorithms.
In the first algorithm (Dmod) the function φAD (in the general statement of
the deception problem) is the modularity loss ML=MG(C)-MG′(C). Dmod’s
greedy strategy at each step picks the edge change with the highest ML. Our
choice to use modularity for community deception stems from the observation
that several community detection algorithms (e.g., [2,16]) are based on modu-
larity maximization. Therefore, if the edge update found by Dmod introduces a
modularity loss, then a community detection algorithm applied to G′ (i.e., G
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Zachary’s Karate Club
(b)
_
Updates on G
G
=0
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=0.436
Updates on G
Fig. 1: Communities found by Louvain [2](a); output of Louvain after modularity-
based deception (b); output of Louvain after safeness-based deception (c).
after applying the update) will possibly give a partitioning in communities more
favorable to C than that in G (i.e., HG
′
> HG). One key feature of Dmod is that
to determine the best edge updates it does not require to recompute modularity
from scratch for each candidate edge. Dmod leverages updating rules (see Sec-
tion 3.1) able to measure the impact of an update on modularity before applying
it. Fig. 1 (b) reports the output of the community detection algorithm AD on
G′, the network obtained after applying the updates found by Dmod (reported
in the inner-box) on G. In terms of deception, the situation for C has improved.
This is because: (i) its members are now spread in two communities (e.g., 24,
is now part of C¯2); (ii) other nodes of C are now grouped with node 3 and 10
in C¯. Indeed, the deception score goes from HG=0 to HG
′
=0.307. Nevertheless,
node 24 is now disconnected from the other members of C. It is worth to men-
tion that the choice of the type of update is subtle. In fact, if one were to add
the edge (24,25) in Fig. 1 (a) instead of (24,1) and running again AD on the
updated network, modularity would have increased and all C′s members would
have remained in the same community; same reasoning for the deletion of (24,33)
instead of (25,26). We will formally study these aspects in Section 3.
Since not all detection algorithms are based on modularity (e.g., [22]) we
have devised another deception algorithm Dsaf where φAD is the safeness gain
ξC=σG′(C) − σG(C). Safeness σ(C) looks at reachability between C′s members
and their connection with nodes not in C (see Section 4). Also in this case it is
possible to determine the impact of updates on safeness before applying them
to G (Section 4.1). The output of AD after applying the changes (see inner-box)
detected by Dsaf is reported in Fig. 1 (c). Intuitively, Dsaf gives a better set
of changes than Dmod since: (i) C
′s members are now equally spread in two
communities while in Fig. 1 (b) this is not the case; (ii) C′s members are now
better “hidden” with nodes in C¯1 and C¯2; (iii) all nodes of C are reachable from
one another. Dsaf gives a higher deception score, that is, H
G′=0.436.
The worst-case scenario discussed in this example underlines how our com-
munity deception algorithms were able to detect a few updates that significantly
increased the deception of C in a real network. Even if in this example the Lou-
vain algorithm was used, our algorithms can deceive any community detection
algorithm as we will discuss in the experimental evaluation section (Section 5).
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3 Community Deception via Modularity
We now introduce the first community deception algorithm (Dmod) based on
modularity [17], a well-studied measure3 in the community detection literature.
Definition 2 (Modularity). Given a network G, the modularity of the parti-
tion of this network into communities C={C1, C2, ...Ck} is given by:
MG(C) = η
m
− δ
4m2
(2)
where η=
∑
Ci∈C |E(Ci)| and δ=
∑
Ci∈C deg(Ci)
2
.
Modularity measures the number of edges falling within groups minus their
expected number in an equivalent network with edges placed at random The
objective of many community detection algorithms is to maximize modularity [3].
Our first deception algorithm Dmod considers the function φAD (see Problem 1)
to be the modularity loss ML=MG(C)−MG′(C) and thus the goal is to find
the set of edge updates where ML is maximized. Newman [16] touched the
somehow related problem of modularity minimization for the discovery of anti-
communities [16]. Our approach differs in two main respects. First, community
deception strives to maximizeML w.r.t. C, that is, via edge updates performed
by C′s members only. Second, Newman’s study did not report on the impact of
the different types of edge updates on modularity while we formally tackle this
problem in Section 3.1.
As anticipated in the running example, Dmod adopts a greedy strategy that
at each step identifies the edge update that brings the highest modularity loss.
In what follows, we first study the modularity loss for the different types of edge
updates and then outline the Dmod algorithm.
3.1 Impact of Edge Updates on Modularity
Let G=(V,E) be a network and C = {C1, C2, ...Ck} a partitioning having mod-
ularity MG(C). Let ML=MG(C)-MG′(C) be the modularity loss and C ⊆ V
a community.
Edge Addition. We first consider the addition of an inter-community edge.
Theorem 3. For any inter-community edge addition (u,w): u ∈ Ci∩C, w ∈ Cj,
with i 6= j giving G′ = (V,E ∪ {(u,w)}) we have that:
ML > 0 if, and only if, ηm(m+1) + 2m
2(deg(Ci)+deg(Cj)+1)−δ(2m+1)
4m2(m+1)2 > 0.
Proof. By manipulating eq. (2) we have that η (sum of edges within communi-
ties) remains unchanged while δ (sum of the degrees in all communities) becomes
δ = δ + 2 + 2deg(Ci) + 2deg(Cj). This gives the new value of modularity:
MG′ (C) =
(
η
m + 1
)
−
(
δ + 2 + 2deg(Ci) + 2deg(Cj)
4(m + 1)2
)
(3)
3 Other types of modularity (e.g., generalized [12]) are orthogonal to our study.
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The possible modularity loss is:
ML =MG(C)−MG′ (C) =
η
m
− δ
4m2
− η
m + 1
+
δ + 2 + 2deg(Ci) + 2deg(Cj)
4(m + 1)2
=
=
η
m(m+ 1)
+
2m2(deg(Ci) + deg(Cj) + 1)− δ(2m+ 1)
4m2(m+ 1)2
The modularity in G′ that derives from the addition of an inter-community
edge is independent from u and w as it only depends on the degrees of deg(Ci)
and deg(Cj); the higher deg(Ci) and deg(Cj) the higher the modularity loss. The
maximum loss can be obtained by picking as source and target communities for
the edge addition the communities having the highest degrees. uunionsq
If C ∈ C, the possible modularity loss depends on the rank (in terms of
degree) of C in C. To give a hint about the result in Theorem 3, consider the
network in Fig. 1 (a) where C ∈ C and deg(C)=24. Note that the edge (26,18)
identified by Dmod brings the highest modularity loss since 18 is in the com-
munity with the highest degree (i.e., deg(C3)=62). If C /∈ C, the result of The-
orem 3 still holds; the edge insertion with the highest possible loss is (u,w):
u ∈ Ci ∩ C, w ∈ Cj and deg(Ci) + deg(Cj) is maximal. We now consider the
addition of an intra-community edge.
Theorem 4. For any intra-community edge addition (u,w): u ∈ Ci ∩C, w ∈ Ci
giving G′ = (V,E ∪ {(u,w)}) we have that:
ML > 0 if, and only if, η−mm(m+1) + 4m
2(deg(Ci)+1)−δ(2m+1)
4m2(m+1)2 > 0.
Proof. By manipulating eq. (2) we have that η′=η+1 and δ′=δ+(deg(Ci)+2)2−
deg(Ci)
2 giving the new value of modularity:
MG′ (C) =
(
η + 1
m + 1
)
−
(
δ + 4 + 4deg(Ci)
4(m + 1)2
)
(4)
The possible loss is independent from u and w; it only depends on the degree
of the community Ci. In this case:
ML =MG(C)−MG′ (C) =
η
m
− δ
4m2
− η + 1
m + 1
+
δ + 4 + 4deg(Ci)
4(m + 1)2
=
=
η −m
m(m+ 1)
+
4m2(deg(Ci) + 1)− δ(2m+ 1)
4m2(m+ 1)2
uunionsq
If C = Ci ∈ C, then the possible modularity loss deriving from an intra-
community edge addition depends on the degree of Ci. If C /∈ C, Theorem 4
still holds; the edge insertion with the possible highest loss is (u,w): u ∈ Ci ∩
C, w ∈ Ci and deg(Ci) is maximal. By considering an inter-community edge
addition between communities Ci and Cj (giving the network G
′) and an intra-
edge addition in the community Ci (giving the network G
′′) we have that:
MG′(C) −MG′′(C)=deg(Ci)−deg(Cj)−2m−12(m+1)2 . Since deg(Ci) ≤ 2m, we have that
MG′(C)−MG′′(C) < 0 and, thus, MG′′(C) >MG′(C).
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Corollary 1. The best edge addition, in terms of possible modularity loss, is
an inter-community edge between the communities Ci and Cj having the highest
cumulative degree and such that Ci ∩C 6= ∅. The modularity loss is the same for
each edge addition no matter the pair of nodes u ∈ Ci and w ∈ Cj.
Edge Deletion. The proofs of the following theorems, similar in spirit to those
of edge additions, are available in the Appendix. We start with the deletion of
an inter-community edge.
Theorem 5. For any inter-community edge deletion (u,w): u ∈ Ci∩C, w ∈ Cj,
with i 6= j giving G′ = (V,E \ {(u,w)}) we have that:
ML > 0 if, and only if, δ(2m−1)−2m2(deg(Ci)+deg(Cj)+1)
4m2(m−1)2 − ηm(m−1) > 0
If C ∈ C, the (possible) modularity loss depends on the rank (in terms of degree)
of C in C. If C /∈ C, the result of Theorem 5 still holds; the edge deletion with
the possible highest loss is (u,w): u ∈ Ci ∩ C, w ∈ Cj , with i 6= j, where the
sum of deg(Ci) and deg(Cj) is minimal. We now consider the deletion of an
intra-community edge.
Theorem 6. For any intra-community edge deletion (u,w): u ∈ Ci ∩ C, w ∈ Ci
giving G′ = (V,E \ {(u,w)}) we have that:
ML > 0 if, and only if, m−η
m(m−1) +
δ(2m−1)−4m2(deg(Ci)−1)
4m2(m−1)2 > 0
If C = Ci ∈ C, then the possible modularity loss deriving from an intra-
community edge deletion depends on the degree of Ci. If C /∈ C, Theorem 6 still
holds; the edge deletion with the possible highest loss is (u,w): u ∈ Ci∩C, w ∈ Ci
and deg(Ci) is minimal. By considering an inter-community edge deletion be-
tween the communities Ci and Cj (and obtaining the network G
′) and an intra-
edge deletion in the community Ci (and obtaining the network G
′′) we have
that: MG′(C) −MG′′(C)= 2m−1+deg(Cj)−deg(Ci)2(m−1)2 . Since deg(Ci) ≤ 2m, we have
that MG′(C)−MG′′(C) > 0 and, thus, MG′(C) >MG′′(C).
Corollary 2. The best edge deletion, in terms of possible modularity loss, is an
intra-community edge in the community Ci having the lowest degree and such
that Ci ∩ C 6= ∅. The modularity loss is the same no matter the pair of nodes
u ∈ Ci ∩ C and w ∈ Ci.
3.2 The Dmod algorithm
The community deception algorithm Dmod outlined in Algorithm 1 builds upon
the analysis performed in Section 3.1. Dmod at each step compares the two most
convenient edge updates (line 14) as per Corollary 1 (lines 5-6; lines 10-12)
and Corollary 2 (lines 3-4; lines 8-9) and returns the update giving the highest
modularity loss. Since the loss only depends from the degree of communities the
algorithm returns the best edge update by randomly picking its endpoints.
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Algorithm 1 Dmod - Community deception via Modularity
1: procedure getBestUpdateModularity(G=(V,E),C,C)
2: if C ∈ C then
3: Let (nk, nl):{nk, nl} ⊆ C with (nk, nl) ∈ E and nk, nl randomly selected
4: Let (np, nt):np∈Ci∩C nt∈Cj randomly selected; Ci, Cj highest degs; (np, nt) /∈ E
5: else
6: Let (nk, nl): nk∈C∩Ci and nl∈Ci randomly selected; Ci has lowest degree; (nk, nl) ∈ E
7: Let np∈C∩Ci be randomly selected, Ci be the highest degree community
8: Let nt∈Cj , Cj 6= Ci has the highest degree and (np, nt) /∈ E
9: end if
10: MLdel= intra-community edge deletion loss for (nk, nl) computed according to Th. 6
11: MLadd= inter-community edge addition loss for (np, nt) computed according to Th. 3
12: if MLdel ≥MLadd then
13: return (V,E \ {(nk, nl)})
14: else
15: return (V,E ∪ {(np, nt)})
16: end if
17: end procedure
4 Community Deception via Safeness
In this section we describe Dsaf , our second algorithm for community deception.
Differently from the Dmod, this approach is independent from any cluster quality
measures. We now introduce the notion of node safeness.
Definition 7 (Node Safeness). Let G = (V,E) be a network, C ⊆ V a com-
munity, and u ∈ C a member of C. The safeness of u in G is defined as:
σG(u) :=
1
2
|V uC | − |E(u,C)|
|C| − 1 +
1
2
|E(u, V \ C)|
deg(u)
(5)
where V uC ⊆ C is the set of nodes reachable from u passing only via nodes in
C, E(u,C) is the set of edges between u and some node in C, E(u, V \ C) is the
set of edges between u and some node not in C.
The leftmost part of eq. (5) takes into account the portion of nodes in C
that can be reached only via other nodes in C balanced by the number of intra-
community edges. In the ideal situation a member of C will be able to reach all
the other members of C with the minimum number of edges, that is, one. This
gives an account of how-well u can transmit information in C. The second term
of eq. (5) gives an account on how u is “hidden” inside the network with respect
to its degree. To increase its safeness u should diversify its connections, that is,
have the right proportion of links with members of communities other than C.
We now define the safeness of C inside a network G:
Definition 8 (Community Safeness Score). Given a network G = (V,E)
and a community C ⊆ V , the safeness of C denoted by σG(C) is defined as:
σG(C) =
∑
u∈C σG(u)
|C|
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Defining the safeness of C starting from the safeness of its members allows
to identify the least safe and rewire their links to increase the score of the
whole C. Safeness allows to control different aspects of a community such as
reachability and internal/external edge balance that were not taken into account
by the modularity loss. C′s members should be able to communicate while at
the same time diversify their connections with members outside C. Moreover,
incorporating reachability in the safeness formula avoids to disconnect C, which
can occur when using the modularity loss as shown in the example in Fig. 1 (b)
where node 24 was disconnected from the other members of C.
Our second deception algorithm Dsaf considers the function φAD to be the
safeness gain ξC=σG′(C) − σG(C) and thus the goal is to find the set of edge
updates where ξC is maximized.
4.1 Impact of Edge Updates on Safeness
As usual, we treat separately edge additions and deletions. However, note that
given a node u ∈ C the safeness score only considers the portion of edges incident
to u connecting u to other members of C and the portion of edges that connect
u to nodes not in C. Thus, instead of talking about intra-community and inter-
community edges, we will talk about intra-C and inter-C edges. We assume wlog
that for every inter-C edge (u,w) we have u ∈ C and w /∈ C. Let G = (V,E) be a
network and C ⊆ V a community having safeness σG(C), we have the following
results (the proofs of the theorems are available in the Appendix.)
Edge Addition. We start with inter-C edge additions.
Theorem 9. For any inter-C edge addition (u,w) s.t. u ∈ C and v /∈ C giving
G′ = (V,E ∪ {(u,w)}) we have that ξC > 0.
Moreover, among all the possible inter-C edge addition, the more beneficial is
that performed by the node with the minimum ratio |E(u,V \C)|deg(u) . We now analyze
the case of the addition of an intra-C edge.
Theorem 10. For any intra-C edge addition (u,w) s.t. {u,w} ⊆ C giving G′ =
(V,E ∪ {(u,w)}) we have ξC > 0 if: (i) w /∈ V uC in G; (ii) w ∈ V uC in G′ and
(iii) the following condition holds:
∑
v∈Cu\{u}
|Cw|
2(|C|-1) +
∑
v∈Cw\{w}
|Cu|
2(|C|-1) +
|Cw|-1
2(|C|-1) +
|Cu|-1
2(|C|-1)−
|E(u, V \ C)|
2deg(u)(deg(u)+1)
− |E(w, V \ C))|
2deg(v)(deg(v)+1)
> 0
where Cu and Cw are the two disconnected components of C in G to which u
and w belong before the addition of (u,w).
The above theorem deals with the addition of an intra-C edge where both
members belong to C. The possibility for such an edge to increase the safeness of
the community occurs when it allows to connect previously disconnected portions
of C. If no new communication paths among nodes of the community are made
available, the new edge will certainly decrease the safeness score. Intuitively, this
is justified by the fact that if the edge does not bring any advantage in terms of
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connectivity among the nodes of C, it will have only the effect to get u and w more
connected to members of C; thus, it is likely that u and w will be considered part
of the same community. We believe that, because of the notion of community
itself, it is reasonable to consider that members of C are reachable in G from one
another via paths involving other members of C, and, thus, the induced subgraph
of G on the nodes in C should have a single connected component.
Corollary 3. The best addition is an inter-C edge from u ∈ C having the lowest
ratio |E(u,V \C)|deg(u) . The safeness gain is the same for each edge (u,w) where w∈V \C.
Edge Deletion. We start with the deletion of an inter-C edge.
Theorem 11. For any inter-C edge deletion (u,w) such that u ∈ C, w /∈ C giving
G′ = (V,E \ {(u,w)}) we have that ξC < 0.
We now analyze the case of the deletion of an intra-C edge by showing that
it does not always bring an increase of safeness.
Theorem 12. For any intra-C edge deletion (u,w) s.t. {u,w} ⊆ C giving G′ =
(V,E \ {(u,w)}) we have that ξC > 0 if:
– w ∈ V uC in G′; or
– w /∈ V uC in G′ and it holds ∑v∈Cu\{u} −|Cw|2(|C|-1)+∑v∈Cw\{w} −|Cu|2(|C|-1)− |Cw|+12(|C|-1)− |Cu|+12(|C|-1)+
E(u,V \C)
2deg(u)(deg(u)-1) +
|E(w,V \C)|
2deg(w)(deg(w)-1)>0, where Cu and Cw are the two disconnected
components of C obtained after deleting (u,w) to which u and w belong.
Similarly to the previous case, since C is a community, it is reasonable to
preserve the possibility for the members of C to communicate with each other
and thus that induced subgraph of G′ on the nodes in C has a single connected
component. By looking at the previous theorems, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 4. The best edge deletion is an intra-C edge (u,w) with {u,w} ⊂ C
having the highest value 1|C|−1 +
|E(u,V \C)|
2deg(u)(deg(u)−1) +
|E(E(w,V \C))|
2deg(w)(deg(w)−1) .
4.2 The Dsaf algorithm
The community deception algorithm Dsaf outlined in Algorithm 2 builds upon
the analysis performed in Section 4.1. Dsaf at each step compares the two most
convenient edge updates (line 13) as per Corollary 4 (lines 2-3) and Corollary 3
(lines 5-7; lines 9-11) and returns the update giving the highest safeness gain.
5 Experimental Evaluation
We now report on the experimental evaluation. We start by describing the ex-
perimental setting, the evaluation methodology, and then report on the results.
Experimental Setting. We performed all the experiments in the worst-case
scenario, that is C ∈ C; we pick a random i ≤ |C| and assume C = Ci. We
investigated to what extent our algorithms Dmod and Dsaf are able to deceive
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Algorithm 2 Dsaf - Community deception via Safeness
1: procedure getBestUpdateSafeness(G,C)
2: Let (nk, nl): {nk, nl} ⊆ C and nk and nl chosen according to Cor. 4.
3: ξdelC = intra-C edge deletion gain for (nk, nl)
4: Let np∈C be the node having the lowest ratio |E(np,V \C)|deg(np)
5: Let nt∈V \C be a randomly selected node, s.t. (np, nt)/∈E
6: ξaddC = inter-C edge addition gain for (np, nt)
7: if ξdelC ≥ ξaddC then
8: return (V,E \ {(nk, nl)})
9: else
10: return (V,E ∪ {(np, nt)})
11: end if
12: end procedure
the following community detection algorithms available in igraph4: Louvain [2]
(louv), Optimal [3] (opt), InfoMap [22] (inf), WalkTrap [18] (walk),Greedy [6]
(gre), SpinGlass [20] (spin), Label propagation [19] (lab), Leading Eigenvec-
tors [16] (eig), and Edge-Betweeness [13] (btw).
Datasets. We considered the following networks: Zachary’s Karate Club (kar),
Dolphins (dol), Les Miserables (lesm), American College Football (ftb), Madrid
Terrorist Network (mad), Books about US Politics (pol), and USA Power Grid
(pow) available online5. We also generated networks according to the community
detection benchmark generator described by Lancichinetti and Fortunato [14]6.
Experiments have been conducted on a PC i5 CPU 2.6 GHz and 8GB RAM.
The code of our implementation in R, the datasets and instructions about how
to replicate the experiments are available online7.
Evaluation Methodology. To measure the success of community deception
algorithms we define the community deception score HG.
Definition 13 (Community Deception Score). Given the output of a de-
tection algorithm AD C = {C1, C2, ...Ck}, the community deception score HG
is:
H
G
(C,AD) = (1−
|S(C)|-1
|C|-1 )
 1
2
|{Ci|Ci ∩ C 6= ∅}|-1
|C| +
1
2
(1−
∑
Ci|Ci∩C 6=∅
|Ci∩C|
|Ci|
|{Ci | Ci ∩ C 6= ∅}|
)
 (6)
S(C) are the connected components in the subgraph induced by C′s members.
The first multiplicative factor in eq. (6) takes into account the fact that a
deception algorithm should preserve as much as possible reachability between
nodes in C. The best situation is when all nodes are in a single connected com-
ponent while the worst case occurs when they all belong to a different connected
component. The second multiplicative factor includes two terms. The first term
measures the community spread, that is, how C′s members are spread within C.
4 http://igraph.org/r
5 http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/netdata
6 The code is available at https://sites.google.com/site/santofortunato/
inthepress2
7 https://github.com/giuseppepirro/com-deception
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It reaches its maximum when each member of C is placed by AD in a different
community. The second term measures community hiding, that is, the average
percentage of C′s members in the communities in C = {C1, C2, ...Ck}. The ideal
situation is when each community Ci ∈ C contains a little percentage of C′s
nodes. Summing up, HG∼1 if (i) C′s nodes are in a single connected components
and (ii) each such nodes belongs to a different (large) community. Conversely,
HG=0 if (i) each member of C belongs to a different connected component or
(ii) C ∈ C. The evaluation has been conducted as shown in Algorithm 3. We
consider a budget of changes β such that |E+|+ |E−| ≤ β and compute the new
values of modularity, safeness and deception score after applying all the updates
found by the deception algorithms and compare them with their initial values.
Algorithm 3 Evaluating Community Deception Algorithms
1: procedure evaluateDeceptionAlgo(G,β, AD,D)
2: C=AD(G)
3: C=getTargetCommunity(C);
4: MG(C)=initialMod(C,G); σG(C)=initialSafe(C, G); HG=initialDecept(C, C,G)
5: while β > 0 do
6: E′= getBestUpdate(G,C,C,D) /* computed via Dmod or Dsaf */
7: G′=(V,E′); β=β-1
8: end while
9: C′=AD(G′);
10: MG′ (C′)=finalMod(C′, G′); σG′ (C)=finalSafe(C, G′); s HG
′
=finalDecept(C, C′, G′)
11: end procedure
5.1 Evaluation Results
We start with real world networks. Fig. 2 reports the values of the deception
score (average of 10 runs) after applying our deception algorithms when varying
the budget of updates β from 1 to 4. Each column represents a dataset and each
row a community detection algorithm. The range of the colors reflects the final
value of the deception score (green is better). White cell reflect problems with
the detection algorithms (e.g., spin does not work with disconnected networks,
opt was stopped after 1h). As it can be observed, results vary with the network
and detection/deception algorithm. A quick look suggests that deception based
on safeness (i.e., Dsaf ) generally performs better.
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Fig. 2: Deception score (H) for modularity-based and safeness-based deception.
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Moreover, the level of deception increases as the number of updates allowed
increases for almost all the algorithms. When β=1, the deception algorithm
based on modularity (i.e., Dmod) obtains the worst deception values with the
network ftb, which represents the schedule of football games between Ameri-
can college teams. On the same network Dsaf performs clearly better. Note also
that Dmod gives the best deception score with β=1 for the network (pow), which
represents the topology of the Wester USA power grid and the algorithms spin
and lab. From a deception point of view, this means that these two algorithms
are deceivable with only one update. In general, from Fig. 2 it can be observed
that already with a single update (β=1) safeness-based deception performs rea-
sonably well, considering that our experiments are conducted in the worst case
scenario (i.e., HG=0). We conducted further experiments (note reported for sake
of space) by considering β=5 and β=6 and observed an increase of H for both
modularity-based and safeness-based deception.
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Fig. 3: Network kar: 34 nodes and 78 edges. Avg |C|=4; Avg |C|=13.
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Fig. 4: Network dolph: 62 nodes and 159 edges. Avg |C|=9; Avg |C|=11.
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Fig. 5: Network mad: 62 nodes and 243 edges. Avg |C|=6; Avg |C|=12.
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Fig. 6: Network pow: 6594 nodes and 4941 edges. Avg |C|=40; Avg |C|=174.
Figures (3)-(6) provide a more detailed view of modularity, safeness and
deception score for four of the considered networks. We also report the size of the
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networks, average number of communities (Avg |C|) considering all the detection
algorithms and average size of the community to hide (Avg |C|). It can be noted
that modularity decreases and safeness increases when the budget β increases.
This confirm the analyses performed in Section 3.1 for modularity and Section 4.1
for safeness. For modularity-based deception, H does not always increase when β
increases while for safeness-based deception H always increases. We explain this
behavior by the fact that modularity-based deception simply aims at maximizing
the modularity loss, while safeness also looks at reachability, which is in some
form incorporated in the deception score (see Definition 13). Indeed, we observed
that in some cases the modularity-based deception algorithm disconnects the
community C while this is avoided by safeness-based deception. Figures (3)-(6)
also suggest that when the size of the network, the size of C and the number
of communities increases, the deception score is higher; it reaches the maximum
value in the pow network (Avg|C| is the 0.025% of the size of G) and the lab
detection algorithm.
We conducted experiments also on artificially generated networks.The goal was
to investigate the impact of the number of communities and size of C on our
deception algorithms because of the correlation observed in the experiments on
real networks previously discussed. The community detection benchmark gener-
ator [14] allows to generate networks having certain characteristics such as: size
(nodes) average node degree (avgD), max degree (maxD), min size (minC) and
max size (maxC) of the communities generated belonging to the ground truth.
In this paper we are not interested in evaluating the performance of detection
algorithms (viz. comparing their output with the ground truth). However, we
noticed that the size of the communities found reflects pretty well the values of
the parameters minC and maxC used in the generation of the networks.
(e) - Deception Modularity (f) - Deception Safeness (g) - Deception Modularity (h) - Deception Safeness
(a) - Deception Modularity (b) - Deception Safeness (c) - Deception Modularity (d) - Deception Safeness
net1: 1024 nodes, avgD=6, maxD=12, minC=8, maxC=32 net2: 1024 nodes, avgD =6, maxD=12, minC=4, maxC=64
net3: 1024 nodes, avgD=6 maxD=12, minC=4, maxC=32 net4: 1024 nodes, avgD=6, maxD=12, minC=4, maxC=16
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Fig. 7: Experiments on networks generated with the benchmarking software [14].
We fixed the size and degree of nodes and generated networks having different
community sizes. For sake fo space, we report in Fig. 7 results on four of the
ten generated networks. Moreover, we report the average results of 10 runs only
for detection algorithms did not generate errors (e.g., the igraph implementation
of spin and opt threw exceptions). As our experiments are performed in the
worst-case scenario (i.e., C ∈ C) we were able to investigate how a variation of
the size of C affects deception. It emerges (Fig 7) that when maxC decreases (i.e.,
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net4) our deception algorithms are able to deceive a larger number of detection
algorithms. We observed the same behavior in all the 10 networks.
Summary. In all the networks and for both deception algorithms we observed a
dependency among size of C (and G), budget β and deception score H. When the
size of C increases by keeping constant |G| and β the deception score decreases.
This can be explained by the fact that spreading a larger number of nodes (as
done by our deception algorithms) requires more network updates. In general,
the lower the ratio |C|/|G| the higher H (no matter the detection algorithm).
We observed that safeness-based deception in ∼80% of the cases does not
change the number of communities while for modularity this happens in ∼60%
of the cases. We leave a more detailed study of this aspect for future work. As for
the running times, they range from ∼1s to up to ∼15s (e.g., for the pow network);
in general, safeness-based deception requires more time than modularity-based
deception as it needs to check and preserve reachability among nodes in C.
6 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
So far the literature has focused on the design of community detection algo-
rithms. While this is certainly useful in some contexts where one wants to un-
derstand the structure of a (complex) network, in some others there is the need
to hide the presence of a community. In this paper we initiate the study of this
problem that we dubbed as community deception. Our community deception
algorithms are based on update rules and thus suitable to deal with network
dynamics [23]. Although we did not deal with node addition/deletions, it is
immediate to see that a node addition corresponds to the creation of a node
followed by (at least) an edge insertion, while a node deletion amounts at a
set of edge deletions. To measure the performance of deception algorithms we
introduced the deception score H. One may be tempted to devise algorithms
that directly optimize H. H has been defined as a measure computed after up-
dating the network as suggested by the deception algorithms and recomputing
the communities via detection algorithms. Our algorithms do not need to re-
compute communities for each update and thus provide a more efficient way to
pursue community deception. From our experimental evaluation it emerged that
the success of deception algorithms depends on the size of the community to be
hidden, the total number of communities, and the size of G.
Devising other instantiation of the general φAD function is an interesting line
of future work. While we have studied how to deceive detection algorithms, it is
also interesting to investigate how detection algorithms can be made deception-
aware. In this respect, a more speculative line of future work is to investigate
whether certain types of complex networks such as biological networks exhibit
some (natural) form of deceptive behavior. Another line of future work is to
consider overlapping communities [11] and networks with attributes [26].
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